



Brexit: What happens next?

Oliver 1 
A British withdrawal from the EU would be a process not an 
event. This Strategic Update sets out the nine overlapping series 
of negotiations that would be trigged and the positions the 27 
remaining EU countries and the EU’s institutions would take, 
gathered from a network of researchers across the continent.
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A vote by the British people to leave the European Union will confront the EU with an 
unprecedented challenge. While the referendum campaign has seen much speculation as 
to what might happen to the UK in the event of a vote to leave, there has been less analysis 
of how the remaining EU might react. To explore how the EU might react this Strategic 
Update explores two sets of issues. 
First, it explains the nine overlapping negotiations – in the UK, between the UK and the 
EU, within the EU, and internationally – that will be triggered by a vote to leave and some 
of the challenges the EU will face in each. 
Second, it sets out what positions each of the twenty-seven remaining EU member states 
and the EU’s institutions might take in negotiations with the UK and amongst themselves 
as they deal with a changing EU. This is based on analysis provided by a network of 
researchers based in each of the other twenty-seven EU member states. 
PART 1: THE nInE BRExIT nEgOTIATIOns
Britain’s 40-year membership means it already signs up to the EU’s acquis, meaning withdrawal 
could in some respects be an enlargement in reverse. However, a UK-EU divorce will be a 
complex one involving twenty seven member states, the European Parliament and a host of 
other interested parties and be about changes in UK-EU and internal EU relations. A British 
withdrawal from the EU would be a process not an event. What happens after a vote to leave 
on 23 June will be shaped by nine overlapping negotiations. The first are UK focused, and 
mentioned here in order to provide context for the wider negotiations at the European level. 
nEgOTIATIOn 1: UK Political
It seems unlikely that David Cameron will immediately resign as prime minister if he loses the 
referendum. HM the Queen cannot accept his resignation until he can perform every prime 
minister’s final duty: to recommend to the sovereign who they should send for to be her 
new prime minister. Cameron’s most immediate successor, the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
George Osborne, has also campaigned for Britain to remain in the EU, meaning he may no 
longer command the support of Conservative MPs. With no clear successor Cameron will 
resign as Conservative leader but remain as a caretaker prime minister for the several months 
it takes the Conservative party to elect a new leader. Unless the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 
2011 is repealed, or a deal done with the opposition parties to dissolve parliament early, 
the next general election will not be until May 2020. 
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nEgOTIATIOn 2: 
UK governance
While UK political leadership will likely be in 
flux for several months, the prime minister 
and cabinet will at least be in a position 
to instruct civil servants and diplomats 
to explore various options for the UK’s 
withdrawal. The British government has 
stated it has not prepared contingency plans 
for a withdrawal, meaning such plans would 
need to be drawn up quickly.1 However, 
which positions the UK intends to pursue 
will not be clear until the leadership race is 
over. Any attempt by the UK government 
to use the leave vote as leverage to attempt 
another renegotiated relationship inside the 
EU – an idea Boris Johnson toyed with at the 
beginning of the campaign – risks a hostile 
responses from the EU and the British public 
and leave campaigners.2
The official Leave campaign, involving 
leadership contenders Boris Johnson and 
Michael Gove, have argued that they would 
like the UK government to seek a deal that 
places the UK outside the EEA.3 This can be 
put down to the need to find agreement 
within a leave campaign where there has 
traditionally been little consensus as to 
what new relationship the UK should seek. 
Although it can also be put down to a desire 
to see a Brexit produce a sizeable shift in 
the UK’s political economy, or a genuine 
belief amongst some leave supporters that 
UK participation in the single market is not 
as important as often argued. If the latter 
belief proved true then a Brexit would test 
some of the core ideas that underpin the 
EU’s unity. However, getting such a deal 
through the House of Commons is not 
guaranteed given the Conservative party’s 
slim majority and that an overall majority of 
MPs have campaigned for the UK to remain 
in the EU.4 UK politicians will therefore 
struggle to interpret what a vote to leave 
actually means in practice. The referendum 
will have seen popular sovereignty assert 
itself over parliamentary sovereignty (the 
right of Parliament to do what it wants) 
with a majority in the Commons at odds 
with what the British people have voted 
for. The Commons could insist on the UK 
remaining in the EEA, but it could not be 
sure of doing this with popular support and 
could not easily call a general election to try 
and settle the matter. Whatever the deal the 
new prime minister decides to push for, the 
British government will have to regularly 
consult parliament during the negotiations. 
The slim Conservative majority, divisions 
within that party and the opportunity for 
opposition parties to cause trouble means 
the possibility of a House of Commons vote 
to reject some part of the UK-EU negotiation 
will be a very real one. A final possibility 
cannot be ruled out, which is that the UK 
government – or the House of Commons – 
calls a referendum on the eventual exit deal 
or new UK-EU relationship.5
Agreement would also need to be reached 
over the role played by the devolved 
administrations and regions such as London. 
Because of the transfer of powers entailed in 
a UK withdrawal form the EU, the permission 
of the Scottish Parliament will be required 
(known as the Sewell Convention) to repeal 
the European Communities Act 1972 
because this would touch on matters that are 
devolved ones.6 Given the UK government 
showed little interest during the UK-EU 
renegotiation in consulting with the devolved 
assemblies and other interested parties, 
it is likely that difficulties will arise in any 
exit negotiations. 
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There is also the possibility of a Brexit 
triggering another Scottish independence 
referendum if the Scots vote to remain while 
the rest of the UK votes to leave the EU, 
with Scotland seeking to remain or rejoin the 
EU. While this is a possibility (although the 
SNP winning a second referendum, even in 
the context of a UK exit from the EU is not 
guaranteed), the SNP lack a majority in the 
Scottish Parliament to trigger a referendum 
(although it is conceivable that a majority 
could be found) and the timeframe for such 
a vote, formal independence to happen 
and (re)securing EU membership could be 
a complex one. Whatever unfolds, it would 
add to the complexity of the negotiations 
that would follow a Brexit. The EU’s priority 
is more likely to be Northern Ireland because 
of Irish concerns discussed below, not least of 
which will be the UK-Irish/EU border.
nEgOTIATIOn 3: UK and 
non-EU countries
The UK will need to undertake negotiations 
with non-EU countries such as the USA 
to discuss any changes a UK withdrawal 
would mean for bilateral relations. In the 
case of the USA this could entail discussion 
of what a Brexit could mean for UK and EU 
relations with NATO, and also over the future 
of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP).7 Depending on the nature 
of the withdrawal agreement, the UK may 
need to discuss new trade agreements with 
non-EU countries where the EU’s own deals 
may no longer apply to the UK. Having not 
negotiated a trade deal since it joined the 
EU, the UK may find itself in a vulnerable 
position as it begins such negotiations. 
While the emphasis here will be on the UK 
to renegotiate with third parties, the EU will 
watch carefully for any possible changes to 
the relationships the EU has with the third 
countries concerned. Having opted for a 
course that the leaders of every British ally 
have advised against, the British government 
would be faced with an immediate need to 
tackle any narrative in the international media 
and political debates that portrays the UK as 
a country that has opted to isolate itself in 
European and international affairs. 
nEgOTIATIOn 4: 
UK and the EU
The UK and EU will need to reach agreement 
over the withdrawal terms, the nature of the 
UK’s future relationship with the EU, and, as 
noted above, potentially over Britain’s place in 
the EU’s international trade deals. As anybody 
who watched the January 2016 Open Europe 
Brexit war-game will have noted, the scenario 
that played out a UK-EU withdrawal became 
a to and fro about the offer of a withdrawal 
deal put forward by the UK representative.8 
This failed to reflect that having presented 
such a deal, the EU would then have discussed 
the deal itself without the UK. The EU is 
notorious for presenting offers with little 
room for compromise because the offer is 
in itself a compromise worked out between 
28 member states - with attention also paid 
to the opinions of the European Parliament 
– which the EU is then loathe to unpick. 
Whether the EU can reach such a compromise 
on what to offer a departing UK will be the 
focus of a great deal of the negotiations and 
play a significant part in deciding what form 
of deal the UK can expect.  
From the EU’s perspective there is only 
one option for considering a UK exit: Article 
50 TEU. 
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Article 50
1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its 
own constitutional requirements.
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of 
its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the 
Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the 
arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future 
relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with 
Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be 
concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after 
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into 
force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification 
referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the 
Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.
4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or 
of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in 
the discussions of the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it.
5. A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union.
6. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be 
subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49.
The Article 50 route is one that some British 
Eurosceptics appear determined to avoid, 
seeing in it a process that strengthens the 
hand of the EU by putting the UK under 
pressure in terms of timing and where an 
agreement would depend on the EU – all 
27 remaining member states, parliaments 
and publics, and the European Parliament – 
agreeing. Unless agreement is reached within 
two years the UK would find itself leaving the 
EU with no choice but to trade with the EU 
under the World Trade Organisation rules.9
The nature of the agreement sought could 
also make reaching agreement more difficult. 
Opinion is divided as to whether the UK and 
EU should seek a deal that involves both the 
exit agreement and a new post-withdrawal 
relationship.10 An attempt to reach a 
comprehensive deal that encapsulates both 
would make the deal a ‘mixed’ one: it would 
cover policy areas where both the EU and the 
member-states have competence.11 Such a 
deal would require ratification by all member 
states, with some potentially required by law 
(or forced by their parliament or through 
public petitions) to ratify the deal through 
a referendum. 
Whatever route is taken, without a well-
drafted withdrawal agreement there would 
be the possibility of endless legal arguments 
and doubts as to the legal status of British and 
EU persons, legal entities in both the UK and 
the EU, and agreements and treaties entered 
into by the EU and UK. Agreement with the 
UK would need to be reached over the large 
number of shared projects and commitments. 
If we take the Swiss-EU relationship as a 
working model, then the UK and EU would 
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need to reach agreement over: the free 
movement of persons, civil aviation, overland 
transport, agriculture, technical barriers 
to trade, public procurement, scientific 
research, Schengen, fraud, education, 
statistics, environment, media, taxation of 
savings, pensions, Europol and Eurojust.12 For 
the UK such a list is likely to be far longer, 
reflecting the UK’s forty years of membership 




Article 50 states that the UK remains a 
member state until a withdrawal has been 
agreed. Until then it is entitled to partake in 
all EU business and meetings except those 
that relate to its withdrawal. This does not 
mean the UK is banished entirely from the 
EU’s negotiations about a Brexit. It does, 
however, mean that the EU will have the 
right to discuss the UK exit without the UK’s 
presence. As it did with the renegotiation, 
the UK will put on a concerted diplomatic 
effort to shape the positions of various 
member states and EU institutions. Unlike 
the renegotiation, the UK cannot assume it 
will automatically have the right to sit in on 
all EU level meetings on the matter. 
How the EU – collectively or as individual 
member states and EU institutions – responds 
to a Brexit will depend on five Is: Ideas, 
Interests, Institutions, International and 
Individuals.13 The biggest tensions within the 
EU will be in balancing ideas (e.g. protecting 
political ideas such as ‘ever closer union’) 
and interests (e.g. limiting the economic, 
social and security costs). Institutional limits 
such as WTO rules and the EU’s own rules 
limit what the EU can and cannot do to 
punish Britain or offer it in terms of a new 
relationship. International pressures may 
convince some EU member states to seek 
a quick agreement with a country that still 
packs a punch internationally. What will 
individual leaders such as Merkel or Hollande 
be able to offer given they face domestic 
elections in 2017? Some individual leaders 
will note their state faces little costs from a 
Brexit, so may seek deals on other matters 
from states that do. 
The EU will face three problems in reaching 
agreement. First, as noted above, the article 
50 process would require the EU to reach 
agreement on a new deal not only with the 
UK but amongst itself. Both the UK and the 
EU could be frustrated by, for example, a 
member state holding a referendum on the 
withdrawal agreement. As becomes clear 
in the section setting out national views, 
the potential economic, social and political 
implications of a Brexit vary across the EU. 
Securing a deal would therefore be of higher 
importance for some states than others, 
creating the possibility of some EU member 
states that are more pro-UK resenting certain 
other states delaying or complicating an 
agreement. 
Second, this raises the broader question of 
whether the EU can maintain a united front in 
facing a withdrawing UK or if disagreement 
amongst themselves and lobbying by the 
UK will prevent any EU solidarity. While the 
UK’s ability to divide and rule should not 
be overplayed, the EU has long struggled 
to create unity in the face of other powers 
such as the USA, Russia or Israel. In the case 
of the UK it would face a state with a long 
record of working the corridors of Brussels. 
Third, due to the aforementioned UK political 
negotiations, for the first few months the 
EU may find it cannot negotiate much with 
the UK as the UK government will be in no 
position to move forward with negotiations. 
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The EU could try to take advantage of the lack of UK leadership so as to push the UK towards 
a certain form of deal. However, this could provoke a backlash in the UK – and not least 
within the Conservative leadership race – adding to the difficulties in reaching an eventual 
deal. This also means that negotiations could drag on and not be as quick as some would like. 
There are seven possible new relationships the EU could reach with the UK, each with pros 
and cons for the EU.14 
1. A customised special deal for the UK 
would see the EU agree to the UK 
picking and choosing which bits of 
EU membership it likes. This would 
see the UK opt out of any costly 
parts of EU membership such as free 
movement or budgetary contributions, 
while retaining access to the single 
market. This could create a type of 
relationship with the EU that is less 
costly than traditional membership, 
leading to understandable concerns 
within the rest of the EU that other 
member states would try to replicate 
it.  
2. An EEA model would see the UK 
adopt a similar relationship to that 
of Norway. For the EU this would 
mean the UK remains in the single 
market, allows free movement of 
labour, contributes to the EU budget, 
upholds EU law, is not part of some 
policy areas such as the CAP or CFP, 
and Britain exercises some limited 
influence over EU decision making. 
The UK government could apply 
safeguard measures (sometimes 
referred to as an ‘emergency break’) 
of the EEA agreement that would 
allow it to restrict free-movement 
from the rest of the EEA and EU. 
3. The EEA model is also a possible 
transitionary arrangement, one the UK 
could enter into to allow it and the 
rest of the EU the time and a stable 
relationship to reach a longer-term 
agreement over a post-withdrawal 
relationship. This transitionary period 
could last several years. During that 
time the UK government could apply 
the ‘emergency break’. 
4. The UK and EU could agree for the 
UK to rejoin the European Free Trade 
Agreement, but the agreement 
connecting EFTA and the EU is 
out-dated, with the main Swiss-EU 
relationship long having developed 
into something unique.  
5. A Swiss model would entail a series of 
bilateral agreements negotiated by the 
UK and EU (see the aforementioned 
list of Swiss-EU agreements). For the 
UK and EU this would ensure the 
continued free movement of goods, 
but not necessarily of services or 
people. The Swiss option has been a 
long-running irritation to the EU, with 
the 2014 Swiss referendum to restrict 
free movement leading the EU to 
demand reforms to the relationship.  
6. A UK that is part of the EU’s customs 
union, like Turkey, would mean the 
UK accepts the EU’s external tariffs 
without having any say over the 
setting of those tariffs. The UK would 
have access to the EU single market 
in goods if it signed up to all relevant 
EU rules. The UK would not be part 
of the FTAs the EU agrees with other 
countries around the world.  
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7. The EU agrees to a free trade 
agreement with the UK. This would 
lower tariffs below WTO levels, but 
largely in goods and not services. 
The UK runs a trade deficit with the 
rest of the EU, this being mainly as a 
result of a deficit in goods. The UK 
runs a trade surplus in services. As a 
result, under an FTA deal EU goods 
would still enter the UK without 
difficulty and vice versa for UK goods, 
but UK services could face difficulties 
gaining entry to the EU market. As 
Jean-Claude Piris of the CER makes 
clear in reviewing this option: “If 
Britain sought to negotiate a more 
substantive FTA than any existing 
template – giving it good access 
to the EU’s single market – the 
other member-states would insist 
on mechanisms for ensuring that it 
automatically adopted new EU rules, 
and for policing the agreement. They 
would also demand payments into 
the EU budget and free movement of 
labour.” 
8. If no agreement were reached over 
the course of the two-year article 50 
negotiating period then the EU-UK 
relationship would automatically 
switch to trading under WTO rules. 
This is widely considered the least 
good deal for UK trade, with the EU’s 
external tariff now applying to trade 
with the UK. A customs border would 
need to be introduced to the EU/Irish-
UK border. The UK would also find 
itself excluded form the FTAs the EU 
has negotiated with countries around 
the world.  
nEgOTIATIOn 6: EU Reform
Negotiations over a British exit will take place 
at the same time as the EU is negotiating 
how to change itself internally to reflect 
the disappearance of the UK. The clearest 
changes will be over allocation of votes under 
QMV, national distribution of MEPs, changes 
to the EU’s budget and spending (which will 
depend to some extent on whether as part of 
an exit deal the UK agrees to contribute in a 
similar way to Norway), and staffing changes. 
We can expect these changes to be fought 
over because of the wider change to the 
EU’s balance of power and direction that a 
British exit would trigger.15 These are changes 
that will add to a Union already in a state of 
flux thanks to the continuing fallout from 
the crises in the Eurozone and Schengen. 
There exist numerous scenarios over how 
the EU will be changed. The position of 
the Eurozone would be strengthened to 
the detriment of non-Eurozone members. 
There has been some speculation that in 
the face of a UK vote to leave countries 
such as France and Germany may make a 
renewed push for integration.16 As becomes 
clear when we turn to the different national 
perspectives on Brexit, a push towards further 
integration risks provoking Eurosceptic 
feelings elsewhere in the EU. The EU could 
see further differentiated integration, but 
again it is not clear where this would be 
headed overall as such integration would 
respond to different aspects of the various 
pressures facing the EU, one of which would 
be a British exit. Proposals such as the ‘Five 
Presidents’ Report’ offer a range of ideas, 
but it remains unclear what overall direction 
will emerge to shape the EU.17 
10      LSE IDEAS Strategic Update 16.2
nEgOTIATIOn 7: The EU 
and the rest of Europe
A seventh series of negotiations may 
be necessary if a British exit changes the 
relationships the EU has with other non-EU 
states such as Norway, Switzerland, Iceland, 
Lichtenstein, or Turkey. Should the new UK-EU 
relationship involve the European Economic 
Area (EEA) or European Free Trade Area (EFTA) 
then there will be discussions primarily with 
Norway (EEA) and Switzerland (EFTA) about 
how the new UK-EU deal affects relationships 
that have become largely tailored to their 
needs. Should the UK secure some new form 
of relationship then these other states may 
be minded to request changes to their own 
relationships to replicate the UK deal. 
nEgOTIATIOn 8: The EU 
and the rest of the World
A British leave vote will damage the EU’s 
image around the world. It will reinforce an 
image of European division and weakness, 
especially amongst states such as Russia. The 
rest of the world will also know from previous 
EU crises that the EU is now likely to spend 
a period of time naval gazing as it comes 
to terms with the fallout form a Brexit. One 
immediate concern will be the future of TTIP. 
The future of TTIP is already deeply uncertain, 
in large part because of public opposition 
from across the EU. While representatives of 
both the USA and the EU have made clear 
TTIP could take place without the UK, the loss 
of as large an economy – and one with large 
trading links with the USA – could easily be 
a fatal blow to negotiations. 
nEgOTIATIOn 9: 
Ongoing EU business
While all this is going on the UK will be 
excluded from discussions and decisions 
relating to its withdrawal, but will remain a 
member of the EU and therefore able to vote 
and conduct business on all other matters in 
the way any member state is entitled to do. 
There will be some unease within the EU 
as to whether the UK should vote or make 
decisions on matters that will shape the EU’s 
policies post-UK exit. There may be some 
pressure for the UK to withdraw from such 
discussions and some in the UK have called 
on the UK to use its remaining powers to 
disrupt EU business as a way of leveraging 
a good exit deal for the UK. The UK is due 
to hold the rotating presidency in the latter 
half of 2017, a position many would deem 
untenable in the event of a vote to leave. 
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PART 2: EU POsITIOns On BRExIT
As the 23 June referendum has approached, the author in cooperation with the LSE’s 
BrexitVote blog put together a series in which researchers based in each EU member state 
(and one for the EU’s institutions) outlined what they felt their member state’s negotiating 
positions would be in the event of a vote by the British people to leave the EU. What 
follows are brief summaries of each of the positions given.18 Many confirm the tension 
noted in the previous section between ideas such as political union and interests such as 
economic links with the UK. 
Austria: Making use of UK-EU tensions 
for domestic purposes.19 
Austria has so far paid little attention to the UK’s referendum and the possibility of Brexit. 
When it came to the UK-EU renegotiation earlier this year, the official Austrian position 
was to support whatever might improve the quality of the European integration process 
without changing its core pillars. For this reason Austria supported efforts to curb benefit 
tourism and improve the EU’s economic governance. In economic relations the impact of 
a Brexit would be much higher for the UK than for Austria due to the low levels of trade 
between the two countries. The strongest support for Brexit comes from Eurosceptic 
and anti-European parties who have used the referendum debate as they did the UK-EU 
renegotiation: to support their argument that the European integration process needs to 
be re-adjusted and that more power should be given back to Austria and other Member 
States. This would not necessarily lead to an exit debate about Austria, but would help 
redefine Austria’s position within the EU. At the same time, the pro-European government 
and pro-European parties view the possibility of Brexit as a chance to re-adjust certain 
policy areas in the EU and in Austrian-EU relations as a means to tackle rising popularity 
and support for populist and Eurosceptic opposition parties.
Belgium: support for the UK staying in the EU, 
but European integration has priority.20 
In historically pro-European Belgium, part of the population is concerned about a possible 
Brexit, while others seize the UK referendum as an opportunity to appeal for reform of the 
EU. As seen during the renegotiations earlier this year, Belgium is a strong partisan for a 
more integrated EU. In the event of a Brexit, one of Belgium’s priorities will be to continue 
on the path to greater integration. Belgium will not accept any ‘Plan B’ for the relationship 
between the EU and the UK. For the Belgian government, the UK has to be either out or in, 
it cannot choose any ‘third way’ envisaged by some. This is because of a fear of triggering a 
domino effect that sees other EU Member States demand similar privileges. Article 50 should 
be employed to negotiate an exit, with the Belgian position being to simplify proceedings 
by negotiating an exit first and a new trade deal second. It is important for Belgium that 
any withdrawal negotiation undertaken with the UK does not block deeper integration. 
Indeed, the Belgian Government would see a Brexit as a possible opportunity to clarify the 
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design and the finality of the European Union, 
possibly through ideas developed amongst 
the group of six founding Members States. 
This is despite the fact that if the UK decides 
to leave the EU, Belgium will be one of most 
exposed EU Member States in economic 
terms. Belgium has one of the largest trade 
surpluses with the UK, equal to 1.8% of 
GDP in 2013.
Bulgaria: Brexit would 
be like UEFA without 
England’s national team and 
Wayne Rooney’s goals.21 
Bulgaria plays a low-profile role in the EU, 
with a policy of shadowing the position of 
other governments – Poland and Visgrad 
countries especially. This was the approach 
taken during the UK’s renegotiation and it 
is therefore unlikely that in the event of a 
UK exit Bulgaria will come up with any red 
lines on its own. Instead it will share many 
other countries’ political concerns – especially 
Germany on big issues - about an eventual 
domino effect of withdrawal referenda 
elsewhere and a serious weakening of the 
EU. One concern the Bulgarian government 
does have is whether a Brexit will weigh on 
Bulgaria’s EU presidency in July-December 
2018. On security, relations with the UK 
through NATO will be important, and the 
UK’s absence will likely weaken EU efforts at 
cooperation on foreign, security and defence 
matters. While trade and population links 
with the UK are not as big as they are for 
other Eastern European countries, Bulgaria 
would still be keen for the UK to remain in 
the EEA to ensure free movement of goods 
and people. As the poorest country in the EU, 
Bulgaria would be interested in a Norwegian 
type settlement for the UK that sees a full 
financial contribution to the EU budget.    
croatia: a strong desire 
to see the UK stay.22 
Croatia is banking on the UK voting to stay 
with little discussion of a Brexit. As the newest 
member of the EU, the preservation of the EU 
is very important to Croatia. It sends a message 
that the effort invested in the accession 
process was worthwhile, that membership 
pays off despite ongoing difficulties, and 
that closing the ranks among partners make 
each stronger. The Croatian view is, therefore, 
more symbolic and normative than issue-
based. The total of Croatian exports to the 
UK is just 2%. The UK extended restrictions 
on the mobility of Croatian workers until 
2018, with a possible further extension for 
another two years after that. Short of a thick 
bilateral agenda between the two countries, 
Croatia has little incentive to discuss any red-
lines in EU negotiations over a UK exit. It is 
hoped that bilateral relations will adapt to any 
new situation and that cooperation within 
NATO will remain unaffected. However, a 
British exit will further undermine the already 
weakened EU enlargement policy to which 
Croatia subscribes and it will open discussion 










cyprus: A sensitive 
approach.23 
While pro-European states such as Cyprus 
might be expected to push for harsh terms 
for those deciding to leave the EU, so that 
a favourable precedent is not created for 
states wanting to exit in future, in the case 
of a UK exit the Government of Cyprus will 
likely be more sensitive and flexible. Given 
the special relationship with the UK, the 
Government will seek to control any adverse 
effects stemming from a possible British 
exit and try to make this development as 
smooth as possible. This desire stems in no 
small part from the fact that commercial 
and financial ties between the two countries 
are of vital importance to the economy of 
Cyprus, and the large number of Cypriot 
nationals living in the UK and vice versa. 
Cyprus will therefore be keen to see the UK 
remain in the EEA. At a political level, close 
relations between the two countries will not 
be affected extensively. The UK retains two 
sovereign military bases on the island and is 
also one of the three countries responsible for 
guaranteeing the independence of Cyprus. 
Consequently, it has a direct involvement in 
the ongoing negotiation process and the 
attempts to reach a peaceful settlement that 
will reunify the island. This direct relationship 
is not dependent on the European position 
of either of the two countries.
czech Republic: A United 
Europe is the Priority.24 
The Czech government fears that Brexit 
could open a Pandora’s box of similar 
developments in other EU member states, 
including the Czech Republic itself. That 
said, while the Czech government will seek 
to protect European integration from the 
fallout from a Brexit, it will also be conscious 
of several other factors linking the UK to the 
EU and Czech Republic. The British export 
market was the fourth most important 
for the Czech Republic in 2015, meaning 
the Czech Government would be keen to 
minimise disruption to economic links. As a 
net beneficiary of EU money from structural 
funds, it would be important for the Czech 
Republic that the EU-UK agreement be 
similar to the arrangement with other non-EU 
members in the EEA. Strong links in security 
and defence will also be sought. Guarantees 
would be sought for the estimated 45,000 
Czech citizens living in the UK.
denmark: Quiet but clear 
support for a close UK-
EU arrangement.25 
While relations with the UK are deemed 
close, there are no signs that post-
withdrawal the present Danish government 
would seek more opt-outs than Denmark 
already has, and thus follow the path of 
Cameron’s renegotiation. There are no 
plans for an in/out referendum (even if 
the left-wing Unity List and the right-
wing Danish People’s Party would like to 
see one). That said, growing skepticism in 
Denmark means there is some sympathy 
for the UK, meaning the maintenance of 
strong links with a non-EU UK would be 
sought, especially in security and defence. 
But at the same time this would need to 
be balanced with the long-standing desire 
by Danish governments for close relations 
with the core of the EU. The dominant 
Danish view is still that the EU is essential 
for Denmark for economic and political 
reasons even if little European mythology 
is expressed. So the general attempts 
to keep the UK as closely involved with 
the EU as possible will be balanced 
against concerns for keeping the EU as a 
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working political and economic structure 
in Europe. The Danish support for a close 
UK association with the EU if the UK leaves 
the EU is therefore likely to be clear but low 
profile – not unlike the Danish stance in the 
UK renegotiation process up until now.
Estonia: Practical 
questions for the Estonian 
EU Presidency.26 
For Estonia the withdrawal of the UK from 
the EU would have an immediate practical 
question in the form of the EU’s rotating 
presidency. The UK is due to fill the EU 
Presidency in the second half of 2017. 
Estonia is supposed to be presiding over the 
EU just after the UK in the first half of 2018. 
Whatever happens with the presidency (if 
the UK retains it or another member state 
steps in), it may be that Estonia and Malta 
(who hold the presidency in the first half of 
2017) will have to step in to informally lead 
on many issues. The Estonian government 
has so far avoided making any comment on 
what a Brexit would mean. A vote for Brexit 
means Estonia would find itself faced with 
some difficult questions which it will need to 
make its position clear on, not least because 
holding the EU’s Presidency means it will 
need to lead on such matters. These will 
include whether it would agree to an EU-UK 
deal that allows the UK continued access to 
the Single Market, whether it would expect 
freedom of movement as part of some 
UK membership of the EEA, and whether 
(and how) the UK could be involved in EU 




Finland: seeking good 
EU-UK relations, but the 
EU is the first priority.27 
Viewed from Helsinki, a Brexit would result in 
substantial economic and political costs which 
are difficult to quantify. The UK’s traditional 
support for reducing intra-EU trade barriers 
and promoting free trade arrangements with 
third countries have made the UK a natural 
ally of Finland. Finland also values the UK’s 
emphasis on pragmatic EU decision-making in 
Brussels. No gains for Finland or the EU have 
therefore been identified in the political and 
expert discussions in Finland about Brexit. A 
constructive and pragmatic approach towards 
Brexit negotiations would probably emerge in 
Helsinki. Avoiding disruption to social, trade 
and economic links more broadly will be a 
Finnish priority. Finnish positions would also 
reflect an assessment of the broader economic 
and political implications of a major member 
state leaving the EU. In this regard, Finland 
would most likely attempt to strike a balance 
between a good and well-functioning EU-UK 
relationship, and unity and cohesion among 
the remaining EU27. Finland has invested a 
lot politically and economically in the EU. This 
includes stabilization of the single currency of 
which Finland is a member, unlike the UK and 
other Nordic EU members. The EU is also seen 
to have positive (yet largely in-direct) security 
implications for Finland in an increasingly 
challenging security environment. Thus the 
viability of European integration will more 
than likely be the first priority for Finland in 




France: Brexit or not, the 
EU shall not recede.28 
The Franco-British relationship within the 
EU is marred with difficulties and only rare 
glimpses of intense cooperation. Bilateral 
relations have been mostly defined outside 
the EU, as illustrated by recent agreements, 
such as the Touquet agreement in 2003 on 
the issue of migration and the Lancaster 
House treaties in 2010 on strategic affairs, 
both of which will likely survive a Brexit. 
France has become increasingly uninterested 
in the UK’s role in the EU. When France thinks 
about the future of the EU, its focus is entirely 
on the Eurozone. Nevertheless, France does 
not support Brexit and would prefer the UK 
to remain. There is fear of contagion, and a 
boost for the Front National, although the 
idea of France voting to leave the EU remains 
one many consider remains far-fetched. 
France remains committed to seeing further 
integration, with further cooperation with 
Germany over defence seen as a possible 
way forward whatever the result of the UK 
referendum. It is very likely that France will 
take a hard line in exit negotiations. An area 
of particular attention for the French will be 
access to the single market, especially in the 
services sector. Some in France hope that a 
Brexit could lead to firms moving to Paris – 
instead of Frankfurt or other places in Europe. 
germany: Thinking less 
about the UK and EU-UK 
relations, and more about 
the EU as a whole.29 
Decision makers in Berlin know that a vote 
for Brexit would be yet another blow to an 
already fragile EU, and the risk of contagion 
is seen as a real danger. At this point in time 
there are discussions about the right balance 
between a signal towards a constructive 
future engagement should the third largest 
member leave, and a signal that discourages 
others to push their luck with concessions in 
the months ahead. Germany will therefore 
respond to a possible Brexit vote in a way that 
communicates with the British government 
and people and to other EU members. As is 
the norm, Germany will turn first to France 
to discuss ideas about how to respond, 
albeit with some caution given there are 
limits to what further Franco-German led 
integration can achieve at this time. There is 
a risk that a Franco-German initiative would 
only contribute to more rifts within the rest 
of the Union. The German government is 
likely to push for the use of Article 50 to 
structure a withdrawal, so as to enforce 
this procedure in case in future another EU 
member embarks on a similar path. 
greece: concerns about 
the unity of the EU 
and Eurozone.30 
Athens’ worries that a Brexit will completely 
change the structures of the EU, with more 
countries either wanting to leave or being 
expelled from the EU or the Eurozone. 
Although the successful completion of the 
first review of the third Greek bailout in May 
2016 ended renewed fears of a Grexit, a Brexit 
could open the ‘Aeolus bag’. Greece played 
no active role in negotiations between the EU 
and the UK that led to the compromise and 
renegotiation of February 2016. The country 
is not expected to significantly influence 
any exit negotiations after 23 June. Its main 
priority would be to push for guarantees 
that Greek nationals in a non-EU UK are 
not disadvantaged. Meanwhile Greece will 
continue with painful reforms to show it is 
committed to the Eurozone and ever closer 
union.
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Hungary: seeking a 
quick exit deal.31 
Hungary, along with the other Visegrad 4 
countries (Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech 
Republic) were strong opponents of the 
UK’s renegotiation demands to limit the free 
movement of labour, and cut in-work and 
out-of-work benefits for EU migrants. Any 
further limitations as part of a new UK-EU 
relationship would face strong resistance. 
Hungary’s primary aim would be to ensure 
that the Hungarian community in the UK 
would not be further discriminated and future 
job seekers would enjoy the same conditions 
as far as possible. If an EEA model for UK-EU 
relations were negotiated then Hungary could 
be expected to insist that free movement of 
people and contributions to the EU budget 
should be part of the deal. Hungary’s main 
export markets are Germany and Austria, 
with the UK standing at 9th place with 3.6% 
of total exports. Nevertheless, Hungary would 
support arrangements that guarantee current 
trade and a stable monetary environment 
across the EU.
Ireland: An exercise in 
damage limitation.32 
Ireland would have more at stake in Brexit 
negotiations than any other Member State. 
For Ireland, there are inherent negatives, of 
varying severity, in every conceivable Brexit 
scenario, be it on the basis of EEA, EFTA, 
or a UK-specific free trade arrangement. A 
protracted negotiation, and a UK outside the 
EU’s customs union, common commercial 
policy and/or single market would leave 
Ireland facing severe disruption to investment 
and trade, and the return of a customs regime 
between Ireland and Northern Ireland with 
potential knock-on effects for the fragile 
Northern Irish peace settlement. The ideal for 
Ireland would naturally be an agreement that 
preserves critical aspects of today’s mutually 
beneficial relationship, mainly the common 
travel area and limiting disruption to the 
€1billion weekly trade flows across the Irish 
Sea (especially in agri-food business). There is, 
in general, significant overlap between Irish 
and British policy priorities, and if this were a 
bilateral negotiation it would be a short and 
amicable one. In a European Council setting, 
however, 26 other Member States would 
have to be accounted for. In such a situation 
it is deeply uncertain whether Irish interests 
could be protected against the disruptive 
impact of a Brexit.
Italy: supports EU 
Integration with or 
without the UK.33  
For Rome, a Brexit might hamper an already 
fragile European political and economic 
stability. Yet, since there is little that can be 
done to block such an eventuality, Italian 
input to a potential UK–EU negotiation 
would be based on Italian national interests 
to maintain good relations with the UK while 
also boosting European integration. Indeed, 
any potential European institutional crisis 
caused by a British exit could be advantageous 
for Italy as it might allow a much-needed set 
of political and economic reforms to revamp 
the process of EU integration. Italy is the UK’s 
seventh largest supplier and trade relations 
between the two have been extremely 
positive, with Italian exports increasing by 
7.6% in 2015. Yet, Italy will not overlook 
how the UK is also interested in maintaining 
positive economic relations with the single 
market. In this situation, Italy might ask to 
trade British access to the single market 
with concessions from the UK in the fields 
of security and migration.
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Latvia: safeguarding 
the EU project.34 
Latvia considers the UK to be one of its most 
important security guarantors and would 
therefore be worried – especially vis-à-vis 
Russia - about the loss of one of the EU’s 
major foreign, security and defence players. 
Free movement is among the most popular 
advantages of the EU in Latvia, and there is 
a fear that Brexit might result in considerable 
limitations to this. The same applies to the 
economic benefits for intra-European trade, 
although the UK is not among Latvia’s main 
trading partners. There is considerable fear 
that Brexit might trigger a domino effect 
in other Eurosceptic countries. This reflects 
back on the Latvian security perception, with 
Latvia seeing EU membership (in addition 
to NATO) as a crucial security guarantee 
against potential Russian aggression. Latvia 
would therefore not oppose a role for the 
UK in the EU on some individual matters of 
mutual concern for both the EU and UK. 
However, the Latvian government insists 
that any changes to the current structures of 
cooperation should be done in accordance 
with EU legislation and should be based on 
mutual interests and ways that safeguard 
the EU project.
Lithuania: Brexit could 
have a hazardous impact 
on “ever closer union”.35 
Although the question of the UK’s EU 
membership is very sensitive, it has not been 
widely discussed in Lithuania. It is, however, 
clear that despite criticism of the UK’s EU 
renegotiation, Lithuania supports keeping 
the UK in the EU. The UK’s membership of 
the EU is of a great importance for Lithuania. 
Both countries have long-standing economic 
ties. Furthermore, with more than 100,000 
Lithuanian citizens living in Britain the 
country remains among the top emigration 
destinations for Lithuanians. Their rights 
and standing in a non-EU UK would be a 
central concern for Lithuania. Lithuania 
also views Brexit in terms of the dividing 
lines that have opened up across the EU 
because of the migration crisis, the terrorist 
attacks in Brussels and Paris, and ongoing 
problems in the Eurozone. The likelihood of 
the necessary cohesion being found amongst 
the EU would be thrown into doubt by a 
Brexit, a development Lithuania would 
not welcome.
Luxembourg: Protecting 
European Integration and 
Financial services.36 
Luxembourg’s foreign policy is based on 
multilateral international cooperation. If the 
EU becomes weaker internally and as a global 
player, Luxembourg becomes weaker too. 
The Luxembourg government is therefore 
concerned on almost all fronts with the 
implications of a UK withdrawal from the 
EU (except perhaps immigration). The most 
sensitive issue is financial services. It would 
be worrying for Luxembourg if the UK were 
to establish more competitive/less regulated 
rules in financial services. On financial services, 
especially the fund industry, Luxembourg 
would expect the UK to show equivalence 
of the rules and potentially accept a certain 
degree of regulatory cooperation to be able 
to continue trading. Luxembourg has an 
important bargaining chip here: it can insist 
on the UK respecting the EU’s acquis and 
financial regulations, or else threaten with 
lobbying the EU and the Commission that 
all euro transactions be settled within a euro 
zone country. Luxembourg could be rather 
accommodating on most other fronts if the 
UK wanted the maximum option of free 
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trade. It would try to work out the most 
comprehensive trade deal with the UK, 
but would insist on the UK respecting the 
acquis. EEA membership would possibly be 
the preferred option.
Malta: One of the 
countries Likely to be 
most affected by Brexit.37 
A Fitch Report of May 2016 named Malta as 
one of a group of EU member states which 
are most likely to be negatively affected by 
Brexit because their exports of goods and 
services to the UK are at least 8% of GDP. 
Any volatility in the value of Sterling could 
hit Malta hard, in part because of the impact 
it would have on the tourist industry (the 
UK being Malta’s single largest source of 
tourists) and because of the impact it could 
have on the value of Maltese investments 
in the UK. A British exit would also make 
it easier for others in the EU to push for 
tax harmonisation, something Malta has 
been able to resist thanks in large part 
to UK opposition. There are also worries 
that Malta’s derogation from the EU’s VAT 
Directive would be exposed by the loss of the 
UK, which has a similar derogation. Concerns 
also revolve around Maltese students in the 
UK and reciprocal health care arrangements. 
netherlands: Helpful, 
but no blank check.38 
The Netherlands is concerned about the 
implications of Brexit for economic and 
political reasons. Not only does the UK run 
a trade deficit with the Netherlands, but a 
great deal of UK trade with the EU transits 
through the Netherlands. Taken together this 
suggests that The Hague would be interested 
in offering the UK access to the single market. 
But this would not be a blank check. The 
Dutch government would likely demand 
Britain pay in to the EU budget in return for 
market access. Access for the UK service 
market is also not guaranteed, in part because 
the Netherlands might try to gain from the 
UK’s departure from the EU’s single market 
in services. Any UK desires for restrictions 
on freedom of movement would be viewed 
with some sympathy due to Dutch public 
unease. Politically, the Dutch government 
has favoured British EU membership to help 
check statist or protectionist tendencies in 
the EU. Ultimately, Brexit would cause EU 
countries to reposition themselves, and with 
Britain’s withdrawal the Netherlands would 
start to lean more towards Germany. Berlin, 
more than London, would shape how the 
Dutch approach the withdrawal talks. 
Poland: going the extra 
mile for Britain but 
not at all costs.39 
The current Polish government sees London 
– rather than Berlin or Paris – as its key ally 
in the EU. ‘Brexit’ would therefore be a blow 
to the government’s vision for Europe and its 
need for friends to defend it in Brussels from 
criticism of controversial domestic reforms. 
The Polish government would likely go the 
extra mile to help a British prime minister 
negotiate a good deal on its future relations 
with the EU. The government may seek 
favours from the UK government in return, 
not least in terms of NATO commitments in 
Eastern Europe. Poland also has an economic 
interest in keeping Britain in the EU’s single 
market, Britain being the second largest 
importer of Polish goods and services. But 
Britain should not expect a free ride from 
Warsaw either. If the UK joins the EEA then 
Warsaw is likely to push for London to 
continue paying into the EU’s budget in a 
similar way as Norway does. Poland sees free 
movement as one of the EU’s major successes, 
and would be reluctant to compromise on 
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this principle if ‘post-Brexit’ Britain wanted 
full access to the common market. This is 
not least because of the estimated 850,000 
Poles in the UK. Warsaw would attempt to 
mitigate any legal uncertainty for its citizens, 
and would urge other EU member-states 
to make the protection of rights of EU 
citizens living in the UK a priority in the 
withdrawal negotiations.
Portugal: Balancing a 
centuries-old alliance with 
a modern commitment 
to the EU.40 
While Portugal has followed a more 
integrationist path than its oldest ally (with 
Portugal also the UK’s oldest ally) within 
the EU (embracing both its economic and 
political dimensions), the two countries share 
an open and outward-looking attitude. 
Among Portuguese elites, the UK has often 
been perceived as key to balancing more 
continental views and so nurture wider 
relations across the globe. Despite this, 
the two countries retain strong economic 
and demographic links. The UK is one of 
Portugal’s top trading partners, and both 
are home to large numbers of each others 
nationals. A recent study identified Portugal 
as one of the EU member states that would 
be more exposed in such a scenario. Beyond 
the possible disruption in economic and 
social relations, as a net recipient from the 
EU budget Portugal could suffer from the 
withdrawal of an important net contributor. 
Lisbon would also lose a counterweight 
to balance other European powers and an 
important partner to promote more liberal 
and Atlanticist initiatives internationally. 
Lisbon is therefore likely to adopt a broadly 
positive and facilitating stance in any exit 
negotiations with a view to UK membership 
of the EEA and continued cooperation in 
foreign, security and defence matters. At 
the same time, Lisbon would be reluctant 
to grant the UK any special privileges, 
particularly out of fear of feeding greater 
Euroscepticism and disintegration dynamics 
in Europe. While Eurosceptic political forces 
in Portugal remain marginal, the Troika years 
have produced a more attentive and critical 
public opinion towards the EU.
Romania: continued free 
movement to the UK will 
be the ultimate redline.41 
Bucharest is very alert to the fact that the 
consequences of the overlapping economic 
crisis, migrant flows and protracted conflicts 
in Europe’s Eastern neighbourhood may 
pave the way for a more inward looking 
political transformation of the EU. It is this 
situation - and especially that surrounding 
migration– that will frame how Romania 
views a UK vote to withdraw from the EU. 
So far, official Romanian positions have been 
limited to supporting Britain’s continued EU 
membership, while conditions envisaged by 
Bucharest would focus on certain provisions 
regarding the rights of EU nationals in the 
UK. From a Romanian perspective, it is 
very worrying that calls for restrictions of 
fundamental EU rights have become a core 
part of the Brexit debate, largely through 
the discourse of mainstream parties. The 
conflation of migrants from the Middle East 
and EU citizens moving inside the EU concerns 
Romania. Continued free-movement for 
Romanian citizens as part of some new UK-
EU relationship that sees the UK remain in 
the EEA will be something Romania will 
push hard for. The Romanian government 
will also be alert to the potential impact 
of Brexit on the transatlantic relationship, 
NATO and sanctions against Russia, with a 
concern that Britain’s departure will weaken 
EU resolve on relations with Russia. 
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slovakia: Quiet 
anticipation at the helm 
of the EU council.42 
Slovakia’s immediate concerns on Brexit are 
about the consequences for the Slovak EU 
Council Presidency that commences on 1 July 
2016 and ends on 31 December. Brexit is the 
one known variable that could seriously derail 
intra-EU communication, agenda-setting and 
the overall political calendar. While Slovakia’s 
six-months rotating Council Presidency will 
inherit most legal dossiers from the current 
Dutch Presidency, a UK decision to leave 
the EU would sideline discussion on many 
issues. Agreement on the EU’s forthcoming 
budget, for example, could be significantly 
disrupted. Existing divisions on a range of 
policy questions are unlikely to disappear 
among an EU of 27 countries. Brexit would be 
another variable for Slovakia’s juggling act in 
crisis management while chairing the Council. 
slovenia: Hoping for 
a remain vote.43 
Slovenia runs a trade surplus with the UK, 
and is therefore worried about the economic 
implications. As a small and open economy, 
Slovenia would be relatively more exposed 
than others. Politically, Slovenia has been 
sympathetic to UK concerns about the EU. 
The UK’s renegotiation was not viewed 
as creating additional political blockades 
to further economic and political union. 
There was even some support in Slovenia 
for strengthening the powers of national 
parliaments. A Brexit, on the other hand, 
could have more significant implications. The 
Slovene government worries the perceived 
strength of the EU will be called into question. 
The negative consequences of the political 
crises the EU has faced during the past few 
years are already showing in the loss of the 
attractiveness of the EU in the Western 
Balkans. The credibility of the EU is essential 
for stability and development of this region 
that is strategically important for Slovenia, 
not least from an economic perspective. Due 
to its relatively small size and asymmetric 
relationship with the UK and other large 
EU powers, in the process of resetting EU-
UK relations Slovenia would be in a weak 
position. It would be shaped by the positions 
of the UK and other large member states. 
However, negative public opinion of the UK 
in Slovenia would strengthen. This would put 
the Slovene government in an unfavourable 
position towards granting concessions to 
the UK.
spain: Brexit will be seen 
through domestic politics.44 
Although a slow and fragile economic 
recovery seems to be gaining pace, political 
uncertainty – and an election on 26 June 
- means Spain’s attention is on domestic 
matters and not the UK. That said, Spanish 
concerns revolve first around that of Spanish 
citizens living in the UK and the position of 
British citizens living in Spain, a group that is 
understandably more concerned about the 
referendum than the Spanish population. If 
Britain leaves, then Britons resident in Spain 
may not be able to presume that their rights 
are guaranteed anymore under the same 
conditions as when the UK was in the EU. The 
main economic concern also focuses on the 
issue of Britons in Spain in the form of British 
tourists who pay more than fifteen million 
visits a year. In terms of EU integration, Spain 
will never defend a ‘less Europe’ strategy 
for itself, but if Brexit becomes a reality any 
Spanish government, whatever its political 
make-up, will have to defend Spaniards’ 
economic and migration interests in a way 
that considers a range of options. 
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sweden: Prioritising 
geopolitics and cultural 
proximity with the UK.45 
Sweden is one of the member states with 
most to lose from a Brexit. Sweden and the 
UK tend to agree on issues such as free trade, 
the further development of the internal 
market and modernization of the EU budget; 
they have a large economic relationship; 
and cooperate as non-Eurozone members 
of the EU; and work together in the EU on 
common security concerns. All might be 
jeopardised by Brexit, with Sweden and other 
non-Eurozone members left exposed by the 
loss of a large non-Eurozone member. The 
Swedish government will therefore play a 
constructive role in Brexit negotiations, with 
fear of geopolitical turbulence and perceived 
cultural proximity likely trumping any fears 
of Brexit damaging the EU. 
EU institutions: EU first 
and looking forward.46 
Much of the EU institution’s attention after 
a vote for Brexit would turn to dealing with 
negotiating a Brexit while also ensuring 
the Union does not break-up thanks to the 
range of pressures it faces. The first thing 
the EU Council would do when it meets 
the week following the referendum would 
be to provide some general guidelines for 
moving forward with the UK and mandating 
the European Commission to conduct 
negotiations following those terms. The 
Commission would proceed as requested 
but would not hesitate to use its central 
negotiating role to shape the process. The 
European Commission is likely to uphold 
its role of promoter of the general interest 
of the Union by taking the steps it thinks 
will keep the rest of the EU together. The 
Parliament will seek to ensure its voice is 
heard throughout negotiations, an important 
consideration given it will have to approve 
any eventual deal between the EU and a 
departing UK. There would be questions 
to answer over the role of British MEPs and 
the future of British nationals working for 
EU institutions. The Parliament is likely to 
look for opportunities to help push forward 
integration in a new way following a Brexit. 
Its own internal evolution would facilitate 
such an attitude, with the loss of British MEPs 
weakening Eurosceptic voices and supporters 
of intergovernmentalism in the parliament. 
Attempts to push forward integration, 
however, could run into opposition from 
member states. Whatever proposal is put 
forward risks creating new tensions and 
divisions within the EU. The leeway would 
therefore be minimal, but in front of a 
chaotic existential crisis, the status quo will 
not be an option for the EU. 
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cOncLUsIOn 
A British exit from the EU would lead to a series of nine overlapping negotiations in which 
will be played out the competing interests (such as economic links between the UK and 
EU) and ideas (such as ‘ever closer union’) of political actors in the UK, the twenty seven 
remaining EU member states, the EU’s institutions, and international partners such as the 
USA. On its own such a development would significantly test the EU, but be one the EU 
would likely muddle through in the face of as it has so far done with crises in the Eurozone 
and Schengen. 
If, however, a Brexit aligned with another major problem facing the EU such as a fresh 
crisis in the Eurozone or Schengen, then Brexit negotiations could easily be defined by a 
collapse in trust between Britain and the EU, an uncertain political situation within Britain, 
and heightened tensions within the remaining EU member states and institutions as they 
struggle to maintain solidarity in the face of several crises aligning.47 This could create the 
biggest test the EU has faced to date.
While it is important not to overlook such a development and take a myopic view of European 
integration, it is worth recalling that the EU has a long history of integrating through facing 
crises. A Brexit could therefore drive forward integration rather than unravel it. Rid of an often 
awkward partner and confronted with the need to stop muddling through and overcome 
a series of crises aligning at once, the EU could find it moves towards a solution that brings 
a degree of enhanced unity that creates a more stable EU.
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